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RECENT DECISIONS
FELONY MURDER-QUESTION AS TO CONTINUANCE OF FELONY
FOR

J URY.-Two of the defendant's confederates were apprehended

in the course of the robbery.

The defendant, not being observed,

attempted to escape through a side exit, which, however, was guarded.
To effectuate his escape he shot the officer while in the exit. The
judge refused to charge that the homicide must occur in the course
of the felony and to charge the different degrees of homicide, but
instructed the jury that if they believed the evidence, they should
find the defendant guilty of felony murder and if they did not believe
the evidence they should acquit. Held, when it is a question of fact
as to whether the homicide occurred during the felony, it is error for
the judge not to submit it to the jury and not to submit the lesser
degrees when the jury might find there was no felony at the time.
People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
A homicide committed in the course of a felony is considered
murder in the first degree, regardless of intent or premeditation.'
There are certain restrictions on this doctrine; the felony must be
independent of the homicide so that there is no merger of the chief
elements, 2 continuing and separately indictable. 3 If the felony has
not been attempted, 4 or has been completed or abandoned 5 the homicide requires proof of intent and deliberation to constitute murder in
the first degree. 6 Homicides occurring during arson, robbery, rape,
burglary and larceny have been held not to merge. 7 However, there
still remains the element of continuance, s which is difficult to limit.
Where the felony occurs on property, the rule seems to be that it is a
9
felony murder if the homicide has been committed on the premises,
or while fleeing with the fruits of the crime, until the fugitive has
reached apparent security. 10 The Court in the present case remarked
that while the presence on the premises may be important, as a means
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of determining whether the felony is going on at the time, it is not
controlling, and since the jury from the evidence could find abandonment of the robbery it was error to charge they should find the defendant guilty if they believed the evidence.
C. T. S.

HOMICIDE-COMMON-LAW

RULE,

THAT

DEATH

OF

VICTIM

MUST OCCUR IN A YEAR AND A DAY. HAS BEEN ABROGATED.-An

indictment for homicide against defendant was dismissed, the victim
having died in a greater period of time than a year and a day. On
appeal, held reversed, the indictment not being faul-y; since the
common-law rule that the victim must die in a year and a day has
been abrogated. People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N. Y. Supp.
86 (2d Dept. 1933).
It is the rule of the old English common law that in order to
sustain an indictment for homicide, the victim must have died within
the period of a year and a day.' This is still the rule in many jurisdictions. 2 The principle has been held to be a rule of evidence 3 and
unless the victim died in the prescribed period, a prosecution for the
homicide could not lie, since evidence would be inadmissible to show
the injury was the cause of death.4 The law in such case presumes
that death proceeded from some other cause than the wound.6
In the case of State v. Dailey,0 it has been held in support of the
year-and-a-day rule, that the common law may be resorted to for
definition of a crime not described in the statutes. This rule cannot
apply in New York since express statutory provision abolishes
common-law crimes and common-law punishments 7 and expressly
defines statutory crimes, persons capable of committing such, and
punishment therefor.8 Thus, the common-law rule herein referred
to cannot apply 0 and an indictment for homicide need not be predicated on death of the victim in a period of a year and a day.10
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